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Members of the North Idaho Water Rights Alliance; Members of the North West Property
Owners Alliance; Members of the Coeur d’Alene Lakeshore Property Owners Association;
Rathdrum Power, LLC; and Hagadone Hospitality Co. (collectively, the “North Idaho Water
Rights Group” or “NIWRG”), the above-named Appellants, by and through their counsel of
record, Norman M. Semanko of Parsons Behle & Latimer, hereby submit their Opening Brief in
this matter on appeal from the Fifth Judicial District, Coeur d’Alene Spokane River Basin
Adjudication, Twin Falls County (Eric J. Wildman, Presiding).
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication (“CSRBA”)
district court decision, granting in part and denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment,
regarding claims by the United States for federal reserved water rights in connection with the
Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation.
2. Course of the Proceedings.
The United States filed a total of 353 federal reserved water right claims in the CSRBA for
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, on behalf of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe (the “Tribe”), as follows:
(1) 17 domestic, commercial, municipal and industrial claims; (2) 72 instream flow claims for fish
habitat; (3) 44 irrigated agriculture claims; (4) one lake level maintenance claim for Lake Coeur
d’Alene; (5) 24 claims for springs and seeps; and (6) 195 claims for wetlands. R. at 5–7, 359–61.
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The State of Idaho, the North Idaho Water Rights Group and other parties to the CSRBA
filed objections and responses to the claims of the United States. Included in these objections was
the State’s concern that “the claimed water right is not necessary to accomplish the primary
purpose for which the Reservation was set aside.” R. at 369–70 (State’s objection to claim no. 917755). This “necessity” objection was also made by members of the North Idaho Water Rights
Group (R. at 385, 425 and 434), as well as by other objectors (R. at 399, 404, 410 and 431).
The district court consolidated the 353 subcases and determined that it would consider the
case in two bifurcated stages, deciding first whether the United States was entitled to a reserved
water right and, if so, the second phase of the case would quantify the right. The district court
made clear: “Issues related to entitlement will be addressed in a single proceeding prior to
litigation of quantification issues.” R. at 462–63 (Order Consolidating Subcases; Scheduling
Order (Feb. 17, 2015)). A summary judgment motion deadline was set, but the district court also
scheduled an evidentiary trial in the entitlement proceeding. R. at 464. No quantification
proceedings were scheduled.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed on the entitlement issues involving all
353 federal claims. A hearing was held in Coeur d’Alene, followed by the district court’s Order
on Motions for Summary Judgment (May 3, 2017) (R. at 4310–32), along with the district court’s
Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use (May 3, 2017) (R. 4301–03)and its original Final Order
Disallowing Water Right Claims (May 3, 2017) (R. 4305–08). The original Final Order disallowed
84 federal claims. Following consideration of a motion to set aside filed by the United States and
the Tribe, the district court issued an Amended Final Order Disallowing Water Right Claims
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(July 26, 2017) (R. at 4468–71), which reinstated 15 federal claims, thereby disallowing a total of
69 claims.
The North Idaho Water Rights Group timely filed its Notice of Appeal on September 6,
2017. Additional notices of appeal were filed by the State of Idaho, the United States and the
Tribe. The transcript and record were consolidated for the four appeals.
3. Statement of the Facts.
The district court adopted the detailed summary of the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation that were provided in Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262, 265–
71 (2001). Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 4–6. They are set out at length in the
district court’s opinion and will not be repeated verbatim here. An abbreviated summary of those
facts is provided here instead, along with a short statement of other relevant facts.
President Johnson issued an Executive Order creating the Coeur d’Alene Indian
Reservation in 1867. The Tribe found the 1867 boundaries unsatisfactory and negotiated an
agreement in 1873 to enlarge the reservation boundaries to include certain waterways, including
almost all of Lake Coeur d’Alene and portions of the St. Joe, Coeur d’Alene and Spokane Rivers.
While the 1873 agreement was not approved by Congress, President Grant issued an additional
Executive Order that same year establishing the enlarged reservation.
In 1887, the Tribe and the United States again negotiated, in response to the Tribe’s 1885
petition to enter into an agreement. As a result, the Tribe agreed to cede all lands outside of the
1873 reservation boundaries.

Congress did not immediately approve the 1887 agreement,

expressing concern about the expanded size of the 1873 reservation boundaries. As a result,
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additional negotiations were authorized in 1889. In the 1889 agreement, the Tribe agreed to cede
the northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene
and the previously included portions of the Coeur d’Alene and Spokane Rivers.
In 1891, Congress approved both the 1887 and 1889 agreements with the Tribe. Idaho, 533
U.S. at 265–71; Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 4–6.
The ceded lands were opened to homestead under the 1891 act. A further cession was
made by agreement in 1894. A 1906 act made provision for surveying the diminished reservation,
allotting lands to the Indians, and opening the unallotted lands to homestead entry. R. at 885–86,
994–97. In pursuance of the provisions of the 1906 act for opening the reservation lands, a
proclamation was issued in 1909 for the opening of lands to settlement and entry, including a
drawing in 1909 and general settlement beginning in 1910. R. at 888–89.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court erred in recognizing fishing and hunting as a primary

purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
2.

Whether the district court erred by allowing claims to proceed to the quantification

phase without first making determinations of necessity during the entitlement phase.
3.

Whether the district court erred in not disallowing instream flow claims within the

Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
4.

Whether the district court erred in not disallowing irrigation claims within the

Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
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5.

Whether the district court erred in not disallowing claim no. 95-16704 (Lake Coeur

d’Alene) within the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
6.

Whether the district court erred in not disallowing ground water claims within the

Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court applies the same

standard of review as that used by the district court when originally ruling on the motion. Mitchell
v. Bingham Mem’l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. First Security Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654,
657 (1998). The determination is to be based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any. Id.; see I.R.C.P. 56(c). However, the Court will liberally
construe the facts in favor of the party opposing the motion, together with all reasonable inferences
from the evidence. Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 422, 942 P.2d at 546. When an action will be tried
before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most
probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence before it and grant summary judgment
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable
Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The claimant of a water right based on
federal law has the ultimate burden of persuasion on each element of the water right. I.C. Sec. 42-
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1411A(12). As to issues of law, the Court exercises free review of the trial court’s decision. Hoffer
v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 294, 47 P.3d 1261, 1264 (2002).
B.

The Law Regarding Federal Reserved Water Rights
The Court has ruled on several cases regarding the doctrine of federal reserved water rights.

See e.g., U.S. v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho 655, 23 P.3d 117 (2001) (regarding the Deer Flat
National Wildlife Refuge claims); State v. United States, 134 Idaho 940, 12 P.3d 1284 (2000)
(regarding the Sawtooth National Recreation Area claims); Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134
Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000) (regarding the Wilderness Act and Hells Canyon Recreation Area
claims); Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912, 12 P.3d 1256 (2000) (regarding the Wild
and Scenic River Act claims); and United States v. State, 131 Idaho 468, 959 P.2d 449 (1998)
(regarding the Public Water Reserve 107 executive order claims).
The Court has made clear that the existence or absence of a reserved water right is a matter
of federal law, relying in its prior decisions upon United States Supreme Court cases and relevant
federal executive and legislative history. Reliance by the Court upon its prior decisions has been
intended simply to incorporate reasoning based upon federal law, not to imply that there is
applicable state law. U.S. v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho at 122. The Court is “not bound by circuit
court precedent even on matters of federal law.” State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 416, 398 P.3d
146, 149 (2017). “Such decisions are authoritative only if the reasoning is persuasive.” Id. Of
course, if the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal law in question, the Idaho
Supreme Court will be bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law. James v.
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City of Boise, Idaho, 136 S.Ct. 685, 686 (2016). With regard to the federal reserved water rights
doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken definitively, as recognized by the Court.
“In deciding whether an implied reservation of water exists, the Court must determine
whether it must be inferred that the executive body involved intended to reserve unappropriated
waters. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976).”
U.S. v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho at 123.

“An intent to reserve water is inferred if water is

necessary for the primary purposes of the reservation and if, without water, the purposes of the
reservation will be entirely defeated.” State v. United States, 134 Idaho at 943, 12 P.3d at 1287,
citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978).
“The necessity of water must be so great that without the water the reservation would be ‘entirely
defeated.’ New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702, 98 S.Ct. 3012.” U.S. v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho at 123.
“Where a reservation of public land for a particular purpose does not expressly declare that water
is needed as a primary use to accomplish the purpose of the reservation, or the exact purpose of
the reservation is not clearly set forth in terms readily demonstrating the necessity for the use of
water, the courts must consider the relevant acts, enabling legislation and history surrounding the
particular reservation under review to determine if a federal reserved water right exists.” United
States v. State, 131 Idaho at 470.
C.

The Primary Purpose of the Reservation Does Not Include Fishing and Hunting
The district court concluded that fishing and hunting was a primary purpose for the federal

government to set aside the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation. At the same time, the district court
recognized agricultural and domestic uses as primary purposes. While the latter uses find generous
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support in the text of the agreements and Congressional acts of the time, fishing and hunting does
not. A detailed review of the agreements (1873, 1887 and 1889), Executive Orders (1867 and
1873) and Congressional actions (1886-1891 and 1906) involving the Coeur d’Alene Reservation
reveal a purposeful and deliberate purpose: promoting an agrarian lifestyle on a diminishing
reservation. This is remarkably similar to the series of events involving the Fort Belknap
Reservation that was at issue in the first federal reserved water right case of Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), in which the purpose of the diminished reservation was “to become a
pastoral and civilized people,” not for the “habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people.”
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
The July 1873 agreement, which led to the enlarged Executive Order reservation that same
year, sought to locate tribal members “on a reservation suitable to their wants as an agricultural
people.” R. at 713 (quoting Smith to the Secretary of the Interior (Nov. 1, 1873)). The 1873
agreement was to provide the tribal members with wagons, plows, horses, a grist mill, a saw mill,
school buildings, a blacksmith and sundry other agricultural implements. R. at 710, 1866.
The need for assistance was understandable, given the statement by tribal leadership that
“we are not as yet quite up to living on farming; with the word of God we took labor too; we began
tilling the ground and we like it; though perhaps slowly we are continually progressing; but our
unaided industry is not as yet up to the white man’s. We think it hard to leave at once old habits
to embrace new ones; for a while yet we need have some hunting and fishing.” R. at 700. From
the entirety of this statement, it seems clear that the overriding goal — the primary purpose — was
agriculture (the future), with hunting and fishing as a fading vocation (the past).
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The agricultural purpose of the reservation was certainly a promising one, given the
favorable remarks on the Tribe’s early agricultural practices, as provided by Governor Isaac
Stevens and Captain John Mullan. R. at 646, 669, 670 and 686.
Accordingly, “the majority of Coeur d’Alene families began to relocate to the DeSmet area
by the late 1870s and early 1880s.” R. at 716. “A final factor in the removal of Coeur d’Alene
families from their traditional villages to Hangman Creek Valley was the relocation of the Sacred
Heart Mission from Cataldo to DeSmet. The Jesuits’ move occurred in 1877. Id. There were
many “well-improved farms[,]” and tribal members had a total of “160 farms” from which they
found “a ready sale for their surplus produce at good prices.” Id. (quoting John A. Simms, Indian
Agent, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1879 and 1880 reports).
By “1877 or 1878,” the Coeur d’Alenes had reportedly “all commenced making small
farms” in the DeSmet area and other lands within the reserve. R. at 725 (quoting James O’Neil,
Resident Farmer, Coeur d’Alene, to Sidney D. Waters, Indian Agent (Mar. 26, 1885)).
At the time of the 1883 survey, tribal members were “far advanced over their white
neighbors” in their agricultural endeavors. R. at 721 (quoting Waters to Price (Nov. 10, 1883)).
In an 1884 letter, Indian Agent Waters called the Coeur d’Alenes “the peers of any farmers on the
Pacific slope.” R. at 723.
In its 1885 petition, the Tribe stressed the need for proper farming implements. R. at 1871.
Congress appropriated funds to negotiate further with the Tribe in 1886. R. at 725. During the
meetings in March 1887, the federal commission met with tribal leaders at the DeSmet mission,
telling them that their farms were far “ahead of the whites.” R. at 726.
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In authorizing additional negotiations in 1889, Congress directed the new commission to
seek the purchase of portions of the reservation “not agricultural.” R. at 733 (quoting Act of
March 2, 1889).
Comments made by tribal members during the 1889 Council meetings focused primarily
on agricultural uses and “improvements.” R. at 740 (Third Council, Aug. 31, 1889; Fourth
Council, Sep. 8, 1889). To be sure, the waterways continued to be used by Indians and non-Indians
alike afterwards. See, e.g., R. at 741–42 (noting “a favorite camping and fishing place” for both
tribal members and “the white people in this vicinity”). But it was not the focus of the reservation.
In 1891, the year Congress ratified the 1887 and 1889 agreements, the local Indian Agent
commended the tribal members’ agricultural efforts, stating that nearly all of them were farmers.
By the mid-1890s, they continued to hold “the finest farms” among all area tribes that boasted
“clean fields, well supplied with stock, modern machinery, good houses and barns.” At the
decade’s end, tribal members reportedly had “a greater acreage in cultivation than ever before”
and were “better farmers than any other tribe connected with this agency.” R. at 741–42 (quoting
Indian Agency reports from Cole (1891), Bubb (1894) and Anderson (1899)).
The fact that “not all tribal members relocated from their traditional village sites along
tribal waterways” with “some families continu[ing] to reside in the lake and river regions well into
the twentieth century” (R. at 716) and that some tribal members “did not abandon their traditional
subsistence practices” into the late 1800s (R. at 743), is not sufficient to find that fishing and
hunting were a primary purpose of the reservation. Agriculture, however, clearly was, just as in
Winters.
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As a result, the federal claims on the reservation that rely upon a fishing and hunting
purpose should be dismissed. This includes the remaining 15 instream flow claims, the lake claim,
and the claims for springs, seeps and wetlands.
D.

The Test of Necessity Defeats the Federal Government’s Reserved Right Claims
The inquiry regarding entitlement to a federal reserved water right does not end with a

determination of the primary purpose of the reservation. The New Mexico “test of necessity” must
be applied. This is critically important because the federal reserved water rights doctrine is a
narrowly tailored exception to the “purposeful and continued deference to state water law by
Congress.” California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978). If allowed, the federal claims
threaten future curtailment of vested, state law water rights. As admitted by the United States:
“The water rights claimed for various consumptive and non-consumptive uses may exceed the
natural flow in a given stream in a particular year. The United States and Coeur d’Alene Tribe
reserve the right to determine in any particular year which use(s), if any, to limit.” R. at 13. Given
Idaho’s system of priority administration, and the senior priorities claimed by the United States, it
is safe to assume that the uses to be limited during times of shortage will not just be those of the
Tribe. The more junior state law water right holders on the system will be adversely impacted.
That is why the stringency of the necessity test is so important. See also, U.S. v. State of Idaho,
135 Idaho at 666 (observing that federal reserved water right for Wildlife Refuge would make state
law irrigation water rights inferior and subject to interruption).
The district court correctly identified this critical task, citing New Mexico for the
proposition that a federal reserved water right may be implied only after the court “has carefully
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examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved,
and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.”
R. at 4316 (Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 7 (quoting New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700))
(emphasis added); R. at 4318 (Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 9, n.4 (“a primary
purpose may only carry a federal reserved water right if ‘without the water the purposes of the
reservation would be entirely defeated.’ New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.”)).
However, the district court stopped short of actually applying the necessity test, seeming
to settle instead on identifying the primary purposes of the reservation and implying a federal
reserved water right from that finding alone. R. at 4322 (Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
at 13 (“one primary purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was to provide the Tribe with the
important waterways needed to facilitate its traditional fishing and hunting practices. . . . The Court
therefore concludes that when the United States reserved land for use as the Coeur d’Alene Indian
Reservation, it impliedly reserved water rights necessary to fulfill the fishing and hunting purpose
of the reservation”)). Applying the test below, it is clear that certain federal reserved water right
claims are not necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation and should be disallowed.
1.

Fishing and Hunting Purposes Are Not Entirely Defeated Without a Federal
Reserved Water Right.

Application of the New Mexico “test of necessity” here indicates that no federal reserved
water right exists for fish and hunting purposes. In conducting this analysis, it is helpful to first
review the Court’s previous decisions applying the test.
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For example, the Court previously found no basis for a federal reserved water right in the
Sawtooth National Recreation Area (“SNRA”), despite the existence of a fish and wildlife purpose
of use. State v. United States, 134 Idaho 940, 945–47, 12 P.3d 1284, 1289–91 (2000). The primary
purpose of the reservation was to regulate development and mining in the SNRA “in order to
preserve and protect the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and wildlife values of the area,
as well as to enhance the recreational values associated with the area.” Id. at 944. The district court
took judicial notice of the fact that fish require water to live, and because the primary purpose of
the reservation included the protection of fish and wildlife values, ruled that water was necessary
to fulfill the primary purpose. The Court disagreed. Id. at 944–45.
“In order to meet the test of necessity required for a federal reserved water right, the need
for water must be so great that, without water, the primary purpose of the reservation will be
entirely defeated. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1057.” Id. at 945.
While agreeing that “fish require water,” the Court found that the test of necessity was not met
because the primary purpose of the reservation, including protection of fish and wildlife values,
was being accomplished through the promulgation of land use regulations for the recreation area.
Id. (citing, e.g., 36 C.F.R. Secs. 292.14–292.18 (1999)). Because the purpose of the SNRA was
now being addressed by government regulations, the Court found that the fish and wildlife purpose
would not be entirely defeated without water and held that there was no federal reserved water
right. Id. This was true, even though the government regulations were adopted well after the
SNRA was established.
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The New Mexico “test of necessity” was also applied by the Court in the context of a federal
reserved water right claim for the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge. U.S. v. State of Idaho, 135
Idaho 655, 23 P.3d 117 (2001). The federal government claimed that the reservation of islands in
the Snake River, for the purpose of providing a refuge and breeding ground for migratory birds
and other wildlife, created a federal reserved water right. However, the Court found: “The United
States has not shown that the principal objects of the reservations will be defeated without a
reserved water right.” Id. at 664. “One can assume that there was an expectation that the ‘islands’
would remain surrounded by water, but that does not equate to an intent to reserve a federal water
right to accomplish that purpose. Id. The Court observed that the reclamation projects assured
that there would be sufficient water to maintain the islands without a federal reserved water right.
Id. at 666. “Local residents say that the principal factor in preventing water level fluctuations are
the numerous dams and reservoirs upstream.” Id.
Despite the fact that fish and islands both need water, it turns out that neither required a
federal reserved water right under the Court’s previous opinions, applying “the test of necessity”
from New Mexico. The same is true for fishing and hunting on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
The asserted fishing and hunting purpose would not be “entirely defeated” without a federal
reserved water right.
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 173 (1977), the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that the power of the state was adequate for protection of the fish, and a federal
reserved water right was not necessary to fulfill that purpose. This rationale is equally applicable
to the State of Idaho, rendering a federal water right unnecessary to meet the fish and wildlife
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purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Just as federal regulation in the SNRA negated any
need for a federal water right for fish and wildlife, state regulation of fish and wildlife negates such
a need here.
In addition, the State of Idaho has provided vested water right protections for important
waterways within the Reservation boundaries, making a federal water right unnecessary.
In 1927, the Idaho State Legislature authorized and directed the Governor of the State of
Idaho to appropriate in trust for the people of the State of Idaho all of the unappropriated water of
Lake Coeur d’Alene, to preserve the lake for scenic beauty, health, recreation, transportation and
commercial purposes necessary and desirable for all the residents of Idaho. I.C. Sec. 67-6304.
The Governor applied for and was granted water right no. 95-2067 for the preservation of Lake
Coeur d’Alene, which right was licensed and became vested pursuant to the laws of the State of
Idaho. I.C. Sec. 42-220. By its terms, this water right protects the entire lake, including the portion
that lies within the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. The purpose of the United States’ claim for the
lake, including maintaining its historic levels for fish and wildlife purposes, is met by the State.
The same holds true for the United States’ claim for a reserved water right for the St. Joe
River. The purpose of use in the claim is listed as: “Fish habitat for fish species harvested within
the Reservation.” R. at 363. However, these values are already preserved through licensed water
right no. 91-7122, held by the Idaho Water Resource Board and decreed by the Adjudication Court
in the CSRBA on November 13, 2015, for the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life
and recreational values in the St. Joe River.
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Also of importance is the fact that, just as in the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge case,
an upstream dam prevents water level fluctuations in the lake and river. The United States
acknowledges that Post Falls Dam keeps the water at or above natural levels. R. at 11. It is perhaps
not surprising then that “the target fish that are in the lake can and do move freely throughout
different portions of the lake to fulfill their biological requirements.” R. at 588. This is true for
movement by the fish species to and from the rivers and streams, as well. R. at 568, 594.
With this purpose satisfied, the federal claims fail the New Mexico “test of necessity.”
Again, this is critical because every federal reserved water right is an exception to the state law
system of water rights and thereby threatens the availability of water for vested water rights. To
exist, a federal reserved water right must truly be necessary. Here, it is clear they are not.
In total, there are 15 instream flow claims, one claim for the portion of Lake Coeur d’Alene,
24 claims to seeps and springs, and 195 wetland claims within the reservation, all claiming fishing
and/or hunting purposes. As discussed above, these claims fail to meet the New Mexico “test of
necessity.” These federal claims must therefore be disallowed, just as those in the SNRA and the
Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge were.
2.

Water Is Not Necessary to Fulfill the Agricultural Purpose of the Reservation.

The district court appropriately concluded that “one primary purpose of the reservation was
to establish an agrarian lifestyle for its inhabitants.” R. at 4320 (Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment at 11). But, then, much like with the fishing and hunting purpose of use, the district
court concluded that a reserved water right was implied, without first applying the New Mexico
“test of necessity.” Id. (“It follows [from the primary purpose conclusion] that when the United
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States reserved land for use as the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation it impliedly reserved the
water rights necessary to fulfill that purpose.”). The district court did acknowledge the question
as to whether “agriculture can be sustained to various degrees on the reservation without
irrigation,” but characterized the issue as “one of quantification,” to be reached during the
quantification stage. R. at 4320–21.
However, the question of whether a water right is necessary to fulfill the agricultural
purpose of use — whether that purpose would be entirely defeated without water — is a threshold
entitlement question under the New Mexico “test of necessity,” not a quantification issue. As
discussed below, the record is adequate to make that determination on summary judgment. If,
however, the Court decides that the determination cannot be made on summary judgment, it should
remand the matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing during
the entitlement phase. The quantification phase would follow only if it is determined that the
agricultural use of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation would be entirely defeated without a federal
reserved water right, as set forth in the district court’s Order Consolidating Subcases; Scheduling
Order. R. at 462, 463.
When the necessity test is applied, it is apparent that the agricultural purpose of the
reservation does not require a federal reserved water right.
“In order to meet the test of necessity required for a federal reserved water right, the need
for water must be so great that, without water, the primary purpose of the reservation will be
entirely defeated. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1057.” State v.
United States, 134 Idaho at 945. Here, there is ample evidence in the record that irrigation is not
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required on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation — at all. There is no evidence in the record that
irrigation is required, or that the agricultural purpose of the reservation would be “entirely
defeated” without water. This is highly problematic for the United States, given that the ultimate
burden of persuasion for a federal reserved water right claim is on the claimant. I.C. Sec. 421411A(12); R. at 837. Given the dearth of evidence, there is no basis to sustain a finding that
water is necessary to satisfy the agricultural purpose of the reservation.
The State’s historical expert (Wee) reported that the reservation “area was well watered.”
R. at 2948. He found no discussion in the historical record of irrigation systems being constructed
and used by the Coeur d’Alene Indians; it was dry farming. R. at 2965. He found no historical
documentary evidence that indicates irrigation was practiced. R. at 2970–71. As time went on, he
concluded, the practice continued to be dry farming, with no evidence that the Tribe or its members
developed irrigation works. R. at 3114–15. In their rebuttal reports, the experts for the United
States (Smith) and the Tribe (Hart) provided no evidence of actual irrigation or the need for
irrigation on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. R. at 796–97, 1975–2010. The closest they got to
the mark was when Hart noted that agriculture was impossible without irrigation — in Utah. R.
at 1979. Tellingly, Smith claimed that “these topics do not directly relate to the purposes for which
the reservation was created.” R. at 796. Hart ultimately acknowledged that dry farming was used
on the reservation. R. at 1980, 1986.
In the 1906 Act opening the reservation to allotment and disposal, the funds from the sale
of lands were to be expended for the benefit of the Coeur d’Alene Indians, including “the purchase
of stock cattle, horse teams, harness, wagons, mowing machines, horse-rakes, thrashing machines,

18

and other agricultural implements for issue to said Indians.” R. at 996. There was no provision
included for water facilities (e.g., irrigation) for the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, unlike the water
facilities provided for the Flathead Reservation in Montana as part of the 1906 Indian
Appropriations Bill. R. 1008. This, despite the fact that the tribal leadership was advised of the
bill in council by Acting Superintendent Worley and told that they could suggest changes. They
asked for nothing else. R. at 1024–35, 1087–88.
A federal government report in 1921 observed that lands in and around the reservation had
“been diked, drained, and put under cultivation” and were “very productive.” R. at 883. The
report also discussed the need for the formation of drainage districts, so lands could be productively
farmed. R. at 884. The government surveys included lands down to an elevation of about 2,121
feet. Their agricultural value, unless they were drained, was questionable. R. at 888–89. The only
mention of irrigation was the potential use of Lake Coeur d’Alene as a storage reservoir for
irrigation of desert lands along the Columbia River, in Washington State. R. at 907. If irrigation
was needed on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, it would make little sense to consider storing it for
use downstream in Washington State instead.
And in 1934, a Congressional summary involving the Coeur d’Alene Reservation reported:
“No irrigation projects on this jurisdiction and none needed.” R. at 935. The report, prepared by
the Coeur d’Alene Indian Superintendent, stated that the crops grown by the tribal members
included wheat, sweet corn, oats, hay, potatoes and garden vegetables. R. at 934. At the
October 23, 1933 hearing held in DeSmet, Idaho, a transcript of which is included in the same
report, the Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee Chairman opened the hearing by stating: “As we
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came through your reservation we find that you have the finest farming land of any Indian
reservation, I think, in the United States. I do not think there is another Indian reservation in all
the United States that has as fine farming land as the Indians here upon this reservation.” R. at
926. And this was accomplished with “[n]o irrigation projects . . . and none needed.” R. at 935.
The fact that irrigation claims are not supportable on the reservation is also indicated by
the United States’ own claims, which seek reserved water rights for both irrigation and wetland
purposes in the same locations. R. at 2297.
Based on the evidence in the record, it is apparent that the agricultural purpose of the
reservation would not be “entirely defeated” without water. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700. As a
result, the federal reserved water right claims filed by the United States for irrigation purposes
should be denied.
In the alternative, if the Court determines that the necessity issue cannot be resolved on
summary judgment, the matter should be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
in the entitlement proceedings to make the necessity determination required under New Mexico.
E.

Without a Lake Level, the Lake Claim Is Unquantifiable and Should Be Dismissed
The district court disallowed the United States’ claim for lake level maintenance of Lake

Coeur d’Alene, based upon a finding that lake level maintenance was not a primary purpose of the
reservation. R. at 4328 (Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 19). This seemed to dispose
of the lake level claim (no. 95-16704). However, because the claim lists “fish and wildlife habitat”
under its claimed purpose of use, the district court allowed the claim to proceed to the
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quantification phase. R. at 4302 (Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use at 2). The claim
should nonetheless be dismissed.
If, as argued above, the Court finds that the primary purpose of the reservation does not
include hunting and fishing, that would dispose of the lake level claim. Alternatively, if, as also
argued above, the Court finds that a federal reserved water right is not necessary to fulfill the
fishing and hunting purpose as it relates to the lake level claim, this would also dispose of the
claim. If neither of these arguments prevails, the lake level claim should be dismissed for the
additional reason that there exists no method for quantifying the claim.
The United States’ “Summary of Federal Lake Elevation Maintenance Claims on Behalf
of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe” indicates that the quantity of the right would be “maintenance of
natural Lake Elevation.” R. at 12. This lake maintenance level is claimed between 2120.4 feet
and 2129.6 feet in elevation. R. at 20 (Attachment V to U.S. Cover Letter (Jan. 30, 2014)
(“Summary of Federal Lake Elevation Maintenance Claims on behalf of Coeur d’Alene Tribe”)).
The district court appropriately held that lake level maintenance is not a purpose of the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Absent the lake levels set forth in the claim — which the district court
disallowed — there is no other standard for the amount of water necessary for the lake. The Court
has held that “[a]bsence of any standard for quantification is indicative of the fact that
quantification was not meant to be determined.” Potlatch Corp., 134 Idaho at 922, 12 P.3d at
1266. As a result, the lake level maintenance claim no. 95-16704 should be dismissed.
If the Court does not dismiss the lake level claim, the district court should be instructed to
take up the North Idaho Water Rights Group’s issue on remand regarding the extent of the
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submerged lands reserved for the Tribe by the United States. As the district court recognized, this
issue relates to the United States’ lake level maintenance claim. R. at 4328 (Order on Motions for
Summary Judgment at 19); see also, Tr. at p. 140, L. 17–25, p. 142, L. 13–20, p. 143, L. 15–19
(discussing need to limit lake level claim to lands submerged at time of reservation). The district
court said it did not reach the issue because it determined that the United States is not entitled to a
federal reserved water right for lake level maintenance as a matter of law. R. at 4328 (Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment at 19). Yet, the district court allowed the lake level claim to go
forward to the quantification stage. R. at 4302 (Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use at 2).
If this is allowed to stand, the issue of the extent of the submerged lands held for the Tribe by the
United States must be heard and decided by the district court.
The federal government only “reserves appurtenant water.” Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2063 (1976). Determining the extent of the submerged lands that
were reserved by the United States is a prerequisite for finding what water is appurtenant to such
lands. It cannot simply be presumed that all of the currently submerged land is owned by the
United States. See e.g., Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 162 Idaho 754, 405 P.3d 13 (2017)
(sufficient proof of alienation of submerged lands would serve to defeat Tribe’s claim of
jurisdiction over such lands). As a result, if the United States’ lake level maintenance claim is not
dismissed here, the submerged lands issue raised by the North Idaho Water Rights Group must be
considered by the district court in further proceedings, and the district court should be so instructed.
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F.

Federal Ground Water Claims Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Binding Authority
and Because They Are Not Necessary to Fulfill the Domestic Purpose
The district court found that water rights for domestic use are necessary “to make the

reservation livable.” R. at 4322 (Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 13 (quoting Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983))). However, the district court erred in not addressing the
legal question as to whether such federal rights can be sourced from ground water. There is no
binding authority to recognize such a right. In addition, a federal reserved water right is not
necessary.
In the process of determining a priority date for the domestic claims, the district court
observed: “While the use of surface water for domestic purposes was surely an aboriginal practice
of the Tribe, the diversion and use of groundwater via wells was not.” R. at 4327 (Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment at 18). The United States did not claim surface water for domestic
purposes, only groundwater.
The United States Supreme Court has declined to apply the federal reserved water rights
doctrine to groundwater. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142. While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has on at least two occasions concluded that such a right exists, the U.S. Supreme Court has not.
In Cappaert, the U.S. Supreme Court based its holding on a conclusion that the water in
the underground pool at issue was surface water, not groundwater. Id. The Ninth Circuit had, it
turns out incorrectly, reached the opposite conclusion. United States v. Cappaert, 503 F.3d 313,
317 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d on other grounds, 426 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1976).
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More recently, the Ninth Circuit found that a federal reserved water right may be sourced
from groundwater. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849
F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2017). However, that interlocutory decision was not reviewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, as the petitions for certiorari were denied. Order List: 583 U.S. (Nov. 27, 2017).
As a result, any binding authority on this question will need to wait.
Recognizing that there was no binding authority establishing that the federal reserved water
rights doctrine extends to groundwater, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to recognize such a
right. In re Gen. Adjudication All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys. (“Big Horn II”),
753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d without opinion sub nom., Wyoming v. United States, 492
U.S. 406 (1989).
Under the New Mexico test, it is difficult to conceive the necessity of a federal ground water
right for domestic purposes in Idaho, given that Idaho law provides an exemption from the
permitting requirement for such uses. I.C. Sec. 42-111. Under this exemption, anyone in the State
of Idaho — including a tribal member — may divert and use up to 13,000 gallons per day for
domestic purposes. Id. This is the same amount being claimed by the federal government. R. at
14. Under these circumstances, the domestic purpose of the reservation would not be “entirely
defeated” without a federal reserved water right. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700. As a result, and
given the lack of any binding authority to support a federal reserved water right sourced from
groundwater, the domestic claims should be denied.
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